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SECTION I – INTRODUCTION 
 
his thesis is a study of the People’s Republic of 
China’s lobbying activity during the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s, with a focus on both the advocacy 
methods used by the Chinese to lobby the U.S. 
government, and the corporate interests that have continually 
weighed in on China’s behalf. Its primary purpose is to 
clarify the significant role that both U.S. multinational 
corporations and Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
have played in China’s lobbying efforts in order to 
demonstrate the extent to which the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA) database—the main foreign 
lobbying transparency system—has failed to adequately 
capture the wealth and institutional resources that these 
interests have put into backing pro-Chinese trade legislation.1  
This work seeks to demonstrate this failure by 
collecting and parsing data taken from reports issued to 
Congress by the FARA Unit—the wing of the Department of 
Justice that serves as the main watchdog of foreign lobbying 
efforts—and contrasting it with corporate lobbying 
disclosures mandated by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 
1995, interviews with lobbyists that command high positions 
within some of Washington’s most powerful firms, previous 
scholarly works, congressional reports, and C.I.A. 
declassifications.2 This aggregated data elucidates the 
drawbacks of the FARA system and brings to light a political  
landscape in which U.S. multinational corporations are  
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retribution—a phenomenon this thesis calls lobbying by 
proxy. Furthermore, it discusses a corporate insurgency in 
the United States that is amassing against Chinese economic 
interests, as well as the potential future developments of 
China’s lobbying efforts. 
 
SECTION II – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section II A. – Developments of Chinese Lobbying Efforts 
 
The first and most renowned scholar to analyze 
China’s attempts to alter U.S. policy is Robert G. Sutter of 
George Washington University. However, while Sutter 
mentions the interactions between China, lobbyists, and 
Congress, he neglects to address the role that U.S. 
multinational corporations and Chinese SOEs play in China’s 
lobbying process. Instead, he focuses on undocumented 
higher-level talks that allegedly took place between 
successive U.S. administrations and the upper echelons of 
Chinese officials. To Sutter’s credit, most of China’s efforts 
to lobby in the United States were targeted at the executive 
branch until around the mid-1990s. In his work that has been 
published after 2000, he fails to address the evolution of 
China’s lobbying methods and incorporate the activities of 
economic interests that weigh in on U.S. policy towards 
China.  
In the rare instances where Sutter does allude to 
China’s efforts to lobby the U.S. Congress, he fails to 
explicitly explain what lobbying, in any specific sense, 
entails. This appears to be a common hole in scholarship on 
China’s lobbying activity for other historians as well, such as 
Qingshan, Dumbaugh, Jian, Xu, and Wang.3 4 Dumbaugh 
does explore how interest groups weigh in on legislation that 
pertains to Chinese interests, but she does not unequivocally 
state the connection between U.S. multinational corporations 
and interest groups. This work will discuss the specific 
methods that Chinese interests use to lobby members of 
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Congress to both enact pro-China legislation and counteract 
anti-China legislation. It does so by interviewing K Street 
lobbyists and soliciting them to describe what the phrase 
actually means in terms of Chinese lobbying tactics. 
Two newspaper articles first made the phenomenon 
of China pressuring U.S. multinational corporations into 
lobbying on behalf of Chinese interests salient to me. In the 
article “The New China Hands,” Ken Silverstein, a 
contributing editor for Harper’s, describes how China 
pressured U.S. corporations into supporting its bid for 
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR).5 Writing in 1997, 
he explains that, “While Beijing has been low-profile in 
approaching the Hill directly, Chinese authorities have made 
it known to the U.S. C.E.O.s that they expect them to stand 
up for China in Washington.”6 Silverstein cites China expert 
Ross Munro, who explains that insubordinate multinational 
corporations risk being barred from investing, putting up 
factories, or selling their products in China if they rebuff its 
demands. The second source is a 1994 Seattle Times article 
in which reporter Stanley Holmes interviews an anonymous 
vice president at Boeing, who is worried that his company’s 
future in China might be “toast,” because of what a Chinese 
official sees as his company’s lackluster lobbying efforts.7 
 This study recognizes that U.S. corporations and 
China’s SOEs are the largest sources of wealth and resources 
that go into pro-China legislation, and seeks to demonstrate 
that agents within the Chinese Embassy in Washington 
solicit major U.S. corporations to lobby on the nation’s 
behalf. It will also elaborate on how these corporations allow 
China to lobby by proxy. Subsequently, by identifying the 
Chinese lobbying tactics that go undocumented in FARA 
disclosures, this work will demonstrate the failings of the 
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Section II B. – Developments of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA) 
 
In 1938, Congress passed the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act (FARA).8 The statute provided that every 
person working as an “agent of a foreign principal,” unless 
excluded by one of the Act’s exemptions,9 had to file a 
registration statement with the Secretary of State.10 Jahad 
Atieh, former editor-in-chief of the Journal of International 
Law at the University of Pennsylvania, argues that, at the 
time of its creation, “the law was not designed to 
substantively censor or restrict foreign propaganda,” but 
rather to deter the dissemination of anti-American ideology 
through mandatory disclosure requirements and fear of 
imprisonment.11 This work adopts Charles Lawson’s notion 
that the pejorative term propaganda remains tied to the act, 
citing it as one of the possible reasons that China, as a 
foreign principal lobbying the United States Congress, 
cultivates corporate proxies in order to avoid the untoward 
sentiments associated with appearing in FARA’s records. 
However, Atieh and Mark Baker, breaking from 
previous scholarship, suggest that FARA has evolved as 
Congress has continually reshaped it to serve as a bulwark 
against anti-U.S. interests at the time. For instance, Atieh 
highlights a “slate of blatant enforcement failures led to 
significant public outcry against the excesses of lobbying, 
prompting Congress to question FARA’s efficacy.”12 Led by 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Congress closed 
several loopholes that allowed non-registry, proposed 
increased penalties for non-compliance, and increased the 
operating budget for enforcement.13 This amendment created 
a broad new class of people who were obligated to register 
under FARA while simultaneously creating a new set of 
loopholes, such as the exemptions for attorneys and U.S.–
based subsidiaries of foreign corporations.14 Michael Spak 
argues that, as there has been no subsequent closing of these 
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loopholes, the 1963 changes were the last major revision to 
FARA itself.15  
 In its most recent iteration, FARA requires a foreign 
agent representing a foreign principal to register with the 
Department of Justice and file a disclosure that outlines the 
purpose of the representation as well as income and 
expenditures of the agent on the behalf of the foreign 
principal.16 The statute defines foreign principals in four 
ways: foreign political parties; persons or organizations 
based outside of the United States (except for citizens of the 
United States); partnerships, associations, corporations, 
organizations, or any other combinations of persons inside 
the United States that are organized under laws of a foreign 
country; and partnerships, corporations, organizations, or any 
other combinations of persons inside the United States that 
have their principal place of business in a foreign country.17 
 The act defines a foreign agent as an individual or 
organization that acts under the order, request, or under the 
direct control of a foreign principal. Moreover, the definition 
also includes an individual or organization whose activities 
are directed by a foreign principal, acts in one or more of the 
four following capacities: engaging in political activities for 
or in the interests of a foreign principal.18 (The term 
“political activities” entails that the agent has a reasonable 
expectation that their behavior will influence any agency or 
official of the United States government or cleavage of the 
American public in terms of U.S. domestic or foreign policy 
or reference to the political or public interests of the foreign 
principal);19 acting in a public relations capacity for a foreign 
principal;20 soliciting or dispensing anything of value within 
the United States for a foreign principal;21 and representing 
the interests of a foreign principal before any agency or 
official of the U.S. government.22 
 Yet the statute stipulates seven categories for foreign 
agents that are exempt from the registration requirement, the 
most significant of which is any agent engaging in lobbying 
activities while also registered under the Lobbying 
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Disclosure Act (LDA).23 The LDA was passed by Congress 
in 1995 in response to the 1980 Toshiba Scandal, during 
which Toshiba avoided legislative sanctions for selling 
advanced military technology to the Soviets by hiring 
agencies that were exempt from required FARA disclosures 
to lobby against its restrictions.24 When the entire scope of 
the events came to light over the course of the next fifteen 
years, Congress again had the impetus to remodel the 
lobbyist transparency system. According to Baker, the 
common sentiment at the time was that, “Since nations today 
compete primarily on an economic rather than a military 
level, national security is directly implicated by any activity 
that threatens the economic health of the nation.”25 Despite 
the calls to amend FARA, by introducing the LDA, Congress 
drastically overhauled the domestic lobbying laws rather than 
those pertaining to foreign sovereigns. The new system 
allows foreign business agents to register under the LDA, a 
system that forces lobbyists to disclose the amount of money 
that their clients spend and how it is distributed among 
individual pieces of legislation.26 Atieh argues that the LDA 
ultimately limited FARA’s comprehensibility, but because it 
focuses on domestic firms lobbying by proxy, he also 
contends that LDA brought to light multiple instances of 
domestic multinational corporations acting as agents of 
foreign sovereigns. Given this conclusion, he contends that 
the LDA has significantly aided FARA, which had 
previously been blind to the influence of multinational 
corporations. 
My work establishes a new criticism of FARA. The 
statute somewhat effectively records the relationship between 
the Chinese government, its embassy, and SOEs and the 
lobbying firms that they contract to advocate on their behalf. 
And while the report issued to Congress each year is quite 
vague—the verbiage of reports for specific foreign principals 
sometimes remains the same for five-year spans—it does 
aggregate and provide useful information. Conversely, 
Congress’ failure to refine its definition of a foreign agent to 
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include U.S. multinational corporations betrays a lack of 
awareness about the significant role that U.S. economic 
interests play in China’s efforts to lobby in the United States. 
An entire universe of lobbying activity related to the interests 
of foreign principals exists entirely out of FARA’s grasp. 
The saving grace of the post-1995 system is the disclosures 
mandated by LDA. Through these disclosures, I was able to 
discern which companies had been lobbying on issues related 
to China, how much money they were spending, and which 
firms or individuals they had contracted. Yet, as this study 
goes on to show, LDA disclosures fail to illustrate the 
connections between this type of corporate lobbying and 
Chinese interests, indicate whether corporations are lobbying 
for or against China-related legislation, or depict what this 
category of corporate lobbying actually entails. 
 
SECTION III – SOURCES & METHODOLOGY 
 
 This study begins by comparing data from two 
sources: FARA’s Annual Reports to Congress,27 and the 
LDA database that compiles inputs made to the Lobbying 
Disclosure Electronic Filing System.28 The Department of 
Justice delivered the Annual Reports as part of a Freedom of 
Information Act request that asked for all reports between 
1940 and 2011. All of the requested reports were delivered 
except for the years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994, which, for 
reasons the Department has kept unclear, do not seem to 
exist. Furthermore, 1942–1944, 1945–1949, and 1988–1991 
were grouped together as one report, and after the passage of 
LDA in 1995, reports were issued to Congress twice a year.  
In order to parse data quickly, the older FARA files 
were scanned by Apple Preview’s optical character 
recognition (OCR) technology so that the search function of 
the program could be used. I went through the China section 
of each report year-by-year, making note of the firms that 
represented the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, 
how much the foreign sovereign was spending, and the 
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reported activities associated with the costs. A collection of 
state-owned enterprises, which prior research indicated had 
ties to the central government of China, also had disclosures 
in the annual FARA reports. And although these SOEs do 
not necessarily fall directly under the jurisdiction of the 
Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), I also 
parsed and included their data in my results because they are 
subject to party control. Most other entries that fell under the 
People’s Republic of China section pertained to normal 
business transactions made by foreign corporations to entities 
within the United States (as stipulated by FARA), but 
because this is documentation of nothing more than normal 
business transactions—and has no relationship to lobbying 
activity—it was ignored. 
 The data from both the Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China and the Chinese SOE disclosures were 
then plotted graphically in order to illustrate trends in China 
lobbying-related spending. These charts were then compared 
with reports aggregated from the LDA database. In order to 
use this database, I searched using the “filings” query and 
opted to search by “specific lobbying issue,” recalling data 
based on chosen terms. The first term I used was “China,” 
generating results in which the word “China” was used in the 
field where registered lobbyists were asked to report their 
client’s intentions for lobbying. Additionally, I used terms 
that would yield results associated with legislation related to 
China such as H.R. 3729, a pending currency bill, MFN 
(most-favored nation) and PNTR, and H.R. 4444, also known 
as the bill that granted China PNTR. Because these queries 
often generated thousands of results, I selected the ones to 
compile and code by two methods: first, which clients were 
spending the most money, and second, which had salient 
household multinational corporation brand names such as 
Boeing, Liberty Mutual, Caterpillar, Nestle, Citigroup, 
Chrysler, General Motors, and Mattel. In order to limit the 
results to only the most financially powerful, and therefore 
applicable, corporations, this study evaluates reports attached 
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to the ten corporations with the highest spending amounts or 
those that previous scholars or journalists have indicated as 
having specific ties to Chinese policy issues. 
 In order to explain the trends that my plotting of the 
FARA data revealed, I turned to previous scholarly works, 
Congressional reports and disclosures, C.I.A. 
declassifications, governmental watchdog reports, interest 
group releases, and news archives. Moreover, in hopes of 
garnering the quite elusive insider’s view of the lobbying 
activity, I conducted interviews with registered K Street 
lobbyists, who were selected based on the status their 
positions commanded within the top lobbying organizations, 
as well as their proximity to Chinese lobbying efforts. 
 
SECTION IV – RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
Section IV A. – General FARA Aggregation and Trends 
 
To be clear, the reason this study focuses on the 
spending of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 
in Washington D.C. is because, as Interviewee 2 explained to 
me, the Embassy initiates its lobbying activity based on 
instructions it receives from the high command of the CCP; 
therefore, the central power structure of China lobbies solely 
through the Embassy. The graph tracing the spending trends 
of China-based interests begins in 1979 because this was the 
first time that the Embassy ever engaged a firm, Surrey 
Morse, to lobby on its behalf.29 It is likely that China 
resumed lobbying efforts in 1979—after nearly 25 years of 
inactivity—the year that China normalized relations with the 
United States. There is a gap between 1991-1994 because, as 
stated in the methodology, no FARA reports were issued to 
Congress for those years. The superimposition of the SOE 
spending indicates that these state-owned corporations 
constituted a majority of the foreign lobbying expenditures in 
the United States. Furthermore, it indicates that a very 
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significant event occurred in 2005, during which Embassy 
and SOE spending dwarfed all other years.30  
 
Section IV B. – The Six Spending Trends of the Embassy and 
SOEs of the PRC 
 
An examination of Figure 1 also elucidates six major 
periods of interests: first, the spending surge from 1984-
1987; second, the spending buildup from 1900-2000; third, 
the inverse correlation between Embassy and SOE spending 
in 1998-2003; fourth, the 2005 event; fifth, the 2008 spike; 
and sixth, the 2009-2010 drop-off. Yet when one attempts to 
use the FARA reports to shed light on these trends, the 
disclosures do very little to explain what actually happened 
beyond disclosing the payments made to law firms as well as 





For example, according to the 1984 report, the 
Embassy contracted Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld for 
the first time in 1984.31 The 1985 report shows that, in 1985, 
the Embassy paid the firm $103,858.90 to provide “counsel 
and advice regarding trade and foreign policy issues, which 
included contacting members and staff of Congress,” on top 
of $99,840.69 already paid to the firm it had had on retainer 
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since 1979, Surrey & Morse, to “[provide] legal services to 
the foreign principal and [contact] members of Congress 
regarding foreign investment regulations…”32 The 1986 
report discloses that, in 1986, the Embassy paid $51,969.55 
to Akin Gump to provide “…general counsel to the foreign 
principal and contacted Congressional U.S.-China tax treaty 
[sic],” paid Jones Day (formerly Surrey & Morse) $30, 
924.50 to “[advise] the foreign principal on matters of 
interests, and contacted U.S. Government officials…” and 
paid an additional firm, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and 
McCloy $20,000 to advise it on “trade regulations between 
the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China, including 
proposals involving the application of countervailing duties 
and antidumping proceedings.”33 These vague service reports 
provided paragraphs and financial figures, but did little to 
elucidate the significant event that occurred between 1984 
and 1987. They indicate general areas of policy, such as 
countervailing duties and antidumping policy, and describe 
very general lobbying methods, such as contacting members 
of Congress, but the overall comprehensiveness of the 
reports is rather lacking.34 This holds true for the FARA 
reports that were released during the six subsequent spending 
trends as well, and the language in those reports—and in all 
of the FARA reports, for that matter—is just as nondescript 
as those from 1984, 1985, and 1986. 
As it turns out, a comprehensive historical analysis is 
necessary in order to expound the events that resulted in 
these six spending trends of the Embassy People’s Republic 
of China and Chinese SOEs that are reflected in Figure 1. 
Using previous scholarship, historical research, 
governmental disclosures, and interviews with K Street 
professionals, I was able to provide some insight as to why 
some of these fluctuations in Embassy and SOE lobbying 
expenditures occurred between 1979 and 2010. 
 
 
1) The Spending Surge 1984-1987 
141Journal of Politics & Society
 
 
 This period of time marks China’s formal initiation 
into both political and economic affairs on the international 
level. In 1984, the world was reaching out to China in a way 
it had not since the days of the Silk Road. Reagan visited 
Beijing for the first time, a Soviet vice-premier made 
agreements with CCP members to modestly advance the 
tepid Sino-Soviet economic relations, and the United 
Kingdom announced the Sino-British Join Declaration, in 
which it promised to return Hong Kong over to Chinese 
sovereignty in 1997.35 Beijing reciprocated these 
engagements in hopes of attracting foreign investment, 
designating fourteen new “open cities,” deemed Special 
Economic Zones (or SEZs), where foreign corporations 
would be allowed to invest in factories and other labor 
pools.36   
In 1985, Chinese President Li Xiannian paid a visit to 
the United States—the first time a modern Chinese head of 
state had done so—likely in anticipation of the power play 
that lay ahead. In 1986, China applied for full membership to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
international agreement that guaranteed fair trade policies 
among member states and was later developed into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).37 As post-Mao China was 
just coming into its industrial and economic capacities in 
1986, accession to GATT marked a significant geopolitical 
stepping stone for the burgeoning economic power. 
The push for accession into GATT explains the 
impetus for the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China 
to spend $378,539 contracting the aforementioned lobbying 
firms to reach out to representatives within the United 
States.38 As Interviewee 3 described, at this period in time, 
China focused most of its lobbying efforts on the executive 
branch, because it considered Congress as nothing more than 
a collection of provincial figureheads with a mercurial base 
of power.39 Furthermore, as this was of specific interest to 
the economic health and development of the nation, agents 
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within the Chinese lobbying apparatus presumably 
compelled SOEs to spend $897,838.79 in the pursuit of 
interests similar to those of the Embassy.40 It is also notable, 
as Figure 1 indicates, that the Embassy and SOEs’ 
application of funds were out of step on this issue. Instead, 
SOE expenditures reached an almost identical peak to that of 
the Embassy almost a year later. It seems most tenable that 
this was due to heavier allocation of SOE expenditures 
toward China’s newly opened SEZ, leaving Embassy-based 
expenditures to compensate in order to maintain China’s 
efforts to attain GATT accession. 
  
2) The Spending Buildup of the 1990s-2000 
 
The most salient event during this period was the ten-
year long political struggle leading up to the passage of 
legislation in 2000 that granted China Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) tariff status.41 In response to the human rights 
violations at the hands of the CCP during the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre, the Clinton Administration issued harsh 
sanctions against China and threatened to discontinue its 
MFN tariff status unless it agreed to refrain from its 
militaristic tendencies.42 The loss of MFN status would mean 
that goods and services exported to the United States from 
China would suffer a significant increase in tariffs, making it 
almost impossible for Chinese businesses to access the U.S. 
market and discouraging corporations based in the U.S. from 
investing in China. This led to a series of political firestorms 
that occurred every June during the 1990s as Congress 
battled over whether or not it should renew China’s MFN 
status. Then, a new actor joined the political fray – the 
business lobby.  
In 2000, major U.S. multinational corporations and 
U.S. advocacy groups championed a successful effort to pass 
a bill that granted China permanent MFN status. As Jian 
Yang explains, multinational corporations, heralding China 
as the new frontier of industry in 1990s, “fought doggedly 
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for renewal…afraid that they might lose the huge China 
market…[believing] that their economic future depended on 
preserving trade with China.”43 In 1993, 298 U.S. 
multinational corporations and 37 trade groups sent a letter to 
President Clinton urging him to support an unconditional 
extension of China’s MFN status.44 Some of the brand names 
at the bottom of the letter were AT&T, American Express, 
Boeing, General Electric, General Motors, I.B.M., and 
Xerox.45 Moreover, in 1996, multinationals with substantial 
business ties to China spent an estimated $20 million on a 
“state-of-the-art lobbying drive” to push forward legislation 
on China’s MFN status.46 At that time, U.S. corporate 
lobbying on China’s MFN status renewal greatly exceeded 
amounts spent by U.S. businesses on any other issue.47 
The Clinton administration took China’s continuing 
human right’s abuses very seriously and intended to use 
MFN-renewal as a bargaining chip to pressure China into 
altering some of its citizen-policing practices. However, after 
an unprecedented effort funded by the largest multinationals 
and spearheaded by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce—the 
largest advocacy group in the United States—Congress and 
the Clinton administration finally caved to political pressure 
and passed a bill ensuring China permanent MFN status in 
2000.48  
However, it would appear improper for the Chinese 
government to be perceived as the champion of its own 
lobbying efforts, and instead utilized its state-owned 
enterprises and U.S. embassy to funnel money into 
Washington.  Between 1979 and 2010, through its SEO and 
embassy channels, China spent just under $24 million (in 
2010 dollars) to cast its influence into a myriad of different 
U.S.–China policy debates and discussions on the Hill. 
 
The registrant rendered legal services to the foreign 
principal in analyzing and monitoring developments 
of interest to the foreign principal in both the 
legislative and executive branch of the U.S. 
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Government. The registrant contacted U.S. 
Government officials to obtain information 
concerning the views of the U.S. Government and the 
status of potential and proposed legislation in regard 
to trade and tariff issues…and U.S. sanctions 
pertaining to the People’s Republic of China.49 
 
This FARA disclosure, given the political context of the 
MFN effort, evinces that most of China’s spending during 
this time was targeted towards monitoring the progress of 
H.R. 4444, the bill that proposed permanent MFN status for 
China. Rather than explicitly referring to specific pieces of 
legislation, China generally describes its involvement in 
order not to draw attention to its actions. As Interview 3 
explains, “[They were] aware that they couldn’t look 
integrated in the effort—it wouldn’t look proper for a foreign 
nation to do that—so instead they were spending money 
trying to put a good face on China.”50 As for what the SOEs 
were up to during this time, we must turn to the next trend. 
 
3) The Inverse Correlation Between Embassy and SOE 
Spending 1998-2003 
 
  In order to understand this period, we must first look 
back to 1995, the year during which Chinese lobbying tactics 
underwent a complete game-change. In May of 1995, Lee 
Teng-hui, then president of Taiwan, was granted a visa to 
attend his reunion at Cornell University after a successful 
lobbying endeavor executed by the politically formidable 
Taiwan lobby.51 Mainland China and Taiwan had been 
adversaries ever since the Communist Party drove the 
Nationalists to Taiwan in 1949, and therefore, the People’s 
Republic of China saw this as a great offense on the part of 
the United States. As a Congressional report on the issue 
explains, “Beijing was quick to voice its outrage and to 
engage in a series of overt retaliatory measures.”52 China 
suspended arms control talks with Washington, postponed 
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cross-strait talks with Taiwan, canceled official visits to and 
from the United States, amassed troops along the coast facing 
Taiwan, and recalled its ambassador to the United States 
back to Beijing.53  
However, this was an instance during which the 
upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party were 
reminded of the power of the United States Congress. It was 
the first time that they ever discerned that there was use in 
lobbying the branch of government that they had, for the 
most part, written off as talking heads. As the report goes on 
to explain: 
 
But not all of China’s reactions were overt. Secretly, 
Beijing worked to prevent similar diplomatic 
surprises from occurring in the future. After 
President Lee’s visit, high-level PRC government 
officials devised plans to increase China’s influence 
over the U.S. political process and be implemented 
by PRC diplomatic posts in the U.S.54 
 
According to a C.I.A. report that was likely written in 1995 
and declassified in June of 2006, after the Lee incident, 
“Chinese Leaders created the Central Leading Group for U.S. 
Congressional Affairs to oversee the task of increasing 
support for Chinese objectives.”55 While some of this new 
lobbying activity amounted to nothing more than traditional 
advocacy, some of it was more ethically questionable. In 
1998, a Congressional investigation discovered that China 
was garnering political influence by illegally funneling 
money from its SOEs to wealthy Chinese businessmen and 
women who were, in turn, making contributions to 
Democratic National Committee campaign coffers.56 The 
disclosure of what essentially amounted to corruption “had 
the effect of dampening somewhat congressional enthusiasm 
for…organizations with an interest in U.S.-China 
relations.”57 In effect, China had taken the wind out of its 
own sails with the political waves already crashing against it. 
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 The unearthing of this political scandal tenably 
explains the inverse correlation between Embassy and SOE 
spending between 1998 and 2003 and the $201,290.96 
increase in SOE spending between 1996 and 1997. 
Subsequently, when a campaign financing scandal came to 
light, the high-level officials at the CPP were conflicted as to 
what to do. They were interested in continuing their 
cultivation of their Congressional contacts, while also aware 
of mounting Congressional opposition to their presence in 
Washington. With the prospect of PNTR looming in the 
distance, they knew the best course of action would be to 
avoid drawing attention to the efforts of the Embassy. 
Therefore, the FARA data suggests that the CPP resolved to 
siphon funds away from the Embassy and disperse them 
among the SOEs who would continue to contract lobbyists to 
further the PNTR campaign. There is not enough data to 
completely corroborate this supposition, but since the 1998 
Congressional report indicated that the CCP had already been 
funneling money through SOEs in order to make 
contributions to DNC candidates—and given the historical 
context—this appears to be the most likely explanation. 
 
4) The 2005 Event 
 
 In 2005, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC), one of the nation’s largest SOEs, attempted to 
purchase the United States’ fifth largest energy company, the 
California-based Unocal, for roughly $17 billion.58 Between 
the Embassy and the SOEs—primarily CNOOC—China 
spent roughly $7.3 million trying to get Congress to approve 
the acquisition.59 Congress was alarmed by the prospect of a 
Chinese takeover of the prominent U.S. company and 
deemed preventing it a matter of “national security.”60 
Chevron was also bidding on the company while pushing 
forth an extensive lobbying effort that eventually landed the 
approval of the CNOOC bid on the desk of president George 
W. Bush for review. 61 In reaction to this, CNOOC’s stock 
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plummeted, and it ultimately withdrew its bid, forfeiting its 
$500 million initial payment. Unocal went on to merge with 
Chevron. 
 This quite decisively explains the vast amount of 
wealth spent by the Embassy and the SOEs during the 
buildup to CNOOC’s bid for Unocal in 2004, the 
comparatively astronomical peak in 2005, and the wind-
down in 2006 (see Fig. 1). CNOOC was attempting to 
combat Chevron’s effort to block the deal by greasing the 
Congressional wheels, with the Embassy following suit. Yet, 
returning to the efficacy of the FARA disclosures, while the 
SOE reports do make mention of the Unocal deal, the 
Embassy service produced paragraphs that make no 
reference, leaving the $458,006.76 increase in spending 
between 2003 and 2005 unexplained.  
 
5) The 2008 Spike 
 
This trend is one of the more difficult to explain. The 
most pressing event in the geopolitical context of 2008 was 
incontrovertibly the worldwide financial crisis. During that 
period, the value of the United States’ economy had 
depreciated significantly, in what has almost become a five-
year economic slump. Because 23.3 percent of China’s 
foreign holdings consist of roughly $1.26 trillion worth of 
U.S. Treasury securities—essentially U.S. debt—the nation 
had a pressing reason to push the U.S. government toward a 
position that would keep the value and credit rating of these 
U.S.-issued securities intact.62 If their values or ratings were 
to fall drastically, the effects could be cataclysmic for the 
People’s Republic of China.  
This aptly explains the $1.2 million spent by the 
Embassy in 2008 on lobbying. It was advocating that 
Congress, and very likely the Obama Administration, take a 
position that ensured that China’s debt holdings in the United 
States would not depreciate.63 The $282,264.40 increase in 
SOE lobbying also corroborates this theory. It seems tenable 
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that the Central Leading Group for U.S. Congressional 
Affairs instructed the only SOE that lobbied that year, the 
China Ocean Shipping Company, to lobby in tandem with 
the Embassy. As the two spending trends diverge greatly, it 
seems that this was an issue that was considered more 
important to the interests of the political leadership of China 
than to the SOEs.  
 
6) The 2009-2010 Decline 
 
 There is no empirical data that suggests why 
Embassy and SOE spending dropped $859,390.80 between 
2008 and 2010. This is most likely a return to normal 
spending rates after two events that required considerable 
amounts of spending. Future research will hopefully be able 
to more decidedly determine the cause of this trend. 
 
Section IV C. – Implications of Lobbying by Proxy Through 
LDA Disclosures 
 
Table 1 (see online) represents a limited selection of 
U.S. multinational corporations’ LDA database’s disclosures 
in which the registrants listed an issue related to China as a 
reason for lobbying. These are by no means all of the LDA 
disclosures that referenced China. As alluded to in the 
methodology section, querying the LDA database with the 
term “China,” “Chinese,” “PRC,” and “People’s Republic of 
China” returned 4,853 reports, implying that there are, at 
least, several hundred company reports that indicate Chinese 
policy as an impetus for lobbying. Additionally, the values 
represented in the “Money Spent” column do not necessarily 
directly correlate to financial resources spent on lobbying 
specific to China-related policy. One of the many flaws of 
the LDA system is that it allows registrants to disclose a 
single monetary figure without specifying how much it 
allotted to particular pieces of legislation or policy issue. 
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The first six entries on Table 1 corroborate the 
aforementioned finding that U.S. multinational corporations 
exerted substantial financial resources in order in ensure the 
passage of H.R. 4444—the bill signed in 2000 that granted 
China PNTR. The sum of the $8.21 million spent by just 
these six companies already dwarfs the $814,539.32 spent by 
the Embassy and SOEs by almost ten-fold.64 This is only the 
spending done by six companies out of the 298 U.S. 
multinational corporations and thirty-seven trade groups that 
were part of China’s PNTR effort, for it is evident from 
Yang’s calculations that companies spent an estimated $20 
million on lobbying for the passage of H.R. 4444.65 These 
figures unquestionably suggest that U.S. multinational 
corporations play an incredibly significant role in pro-China 
policy advocacy, despite the fact that their lobbying activities 
go completely unreported to the FARA lobbying 
transparency system.  
The latter four entries on Table 1 demonstrate that 
the PNTR campaign waged by U.S. companies was not the 
only incident in which U.S. multinationals weighed in on 
China policy. As one can see by the timeframes indicated, 
U.S. corporations attempted to influence Chinese policy well 
after the passage of H.R. 4444. Two corporations in 
particular, Boeing and Caterpillar, are quite interesting in this 
regard. Between 2006 and 2011, Boeing tended to only list 
three lobbying areas of interest on its LDA disclosures, two 
of which were always “U.S. – China Relations” and “China 
Trade Issues.”66 Moreover, as shown in the “Money Spent” 
column, Boeing spent roughly $162 million a year on such 
lobbying activities between 2006 and 2011.67 Interviewee 3 
says that Boeing is probably the company that most often 
lobbies Congress to take pro-China positions, saying that, 
behind closed doors, Boeing has earned the nickname 
“Beijing West.”68 This person says that, when Boeing is 
unable to deliver China’s policy goals, China has been 
known to say, “Fine, we’ll go buy from Airbus instead,” 
making reference to Boeing’s main European competitor .69 
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Caterpillar, on the other hand, is one of the 
corporations that spend heavily on anti-China policy. As 
demonstrated on Table 1, Caterpillar spent $13.73 million 
dollars on lobbying between 2006 and 2011, some of which 
went towards advocacy on S. 14, S. 295, S. 337, S. 984, and 
H.R.2208—all of which are Chinese currency bills, calling 
for China to allow its currency to appreciate naturally in 
order to put a stop to its dumping practices. I was never able 
to make direct contact with a representative from Caterpillar, 
but indirectly obtained information through a contact in 
Washington D.C. In an e-mail, my contact, a lobbyist for 
Caterpillar, explained: “Getting China to change its monetary 
policy is a huge issue and the U.S.—from government to 
businesses—is lobbying China to fix what they see as a 
major inequality that affects trade.”70 This exchange 
indicates that a cleavage of U.S. multinational corporations 
have turned against China in some regard. Caterpillar was 
one of the 298 companies lobbying for the passage of H.R. 
4444.71 This anti-China corporate insurgency is something 
that this thesis will discuss in greater detail in the next 
section. 
 
Section IV D. – Corroborating and Elaborating on Findings 
Through Interviews 
 
  I conducted three formal phone interviews with K 
Street professionals intimately familiar with China’s 
lobbying apparatus. Two respondents, Interviewee 1 and 3, 
were in highly regarded positions within Washington’s most 
coveted lobbying organizations and the third, Interviewee 2, 
was in a top position within a firm that focuses specifically 
on U.S.–China policy. For their own professional protection, 
all interview subjects requested to have their name and 
organizations kept anonymous.  
 All three of the respondents agreed that China’s 
lobbying methods have evolved drastically over the past 20 
years. Interviewee 1 explained:  
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China lobbying has become much more 
sophisticated; they have a better understanding of 
how to use our political system. They used to get 
frustrated when a presidential administration wasn’t 
able to get things done with a snap of their fingers, 
but now they now understand the role of Congress 
and the President. And now they’re better staffed 
with people more savvy with U.S. affairs—they have 
law firms and pay them large retainers. Sometimes 
they can still be a little heavy-handed or tone deaf, 
but they play their cards a lot better than they used to 
in the past.72 
 
Interviewee 3 adds that, “China used to squawk loudly when 
they didn’t get their way, but now they realize it’s politically 
intelligent to keep quiet—they don’t fly off of the handle so 
much anymore. They’re getting more nuanced and savvy 
about Congress by contracting external help like Patton 
Boggs [a Washington D.C. law and lobbying firm].”73 
 As for the notion that China had been using U.S. 
multinational corporations to lobby by proxy, the 
interviewees had differing insights. Interviewee 2 rebuffed 
the idea, claiming that the Chinese often reached out to 
companies that this person’s organization represented, but 
asserting that none of the contacted companies have ever 
complied with a Chinese diplomat’s requests to lobby on 
China’s behalf.74 Interviewee 1 said they had seen evidence 
of lobbying by proxy in the field. This person explained that, 
“China is still able to call in a core group of companies and 
tell them to weigh in in some way.”75 Interviewee 3 agreed, 
stating, “The business community has always been the tip of 
the spear in terms of keeping the U.S.–China relationship on 
a good track.”76 This person went on to say, “There is a lot of 
interaction between the government officials in China and 
U.S. companies.”77 But both Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 3 
said that the motivation for U.S. multinational corporations 
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to lobby on China’s behalf usually did not result from direct 
communication or orders from Chinese governmental 
officials. They explained that it was more of an unspoken 
understanding. 
 Interviewee 1 said, “The pressure is implicit, but 
companies get the joke—the Chinese keep score. And if in 
the future, if you want them to do something for you, they’re 
going to look back and see what you’ve done for them.”78 
Similarly, Interviewee 3 added that, “There is a quid pro quo; 
the Chinese are implying to corporations within their bounds 
that, ‘if you’re going to be successful in our market, you’re 
going to be playing a part in U.S.-China relations.’”79 
Interviewee 3 said that U.S. multinational corporations often 
advocate for China’s position in Congress because they stand 
the most to lose if China decides to resort to economic 
retaliation. He/she related:  
 
In China, there is a lot of governmental regulation; 
they control factory approval, purchasing approval, 
investment approval—city-by-city—so corporations 
have an interest in showing that they’re allied of the 
Government. On commercial issues like PNTR, 
CEOs were making it very known that they were 
being active on the Hill. And the Embassy was 
keeping track of who was testifying before Congress, 
who was making trips to the Capital Building, who 
was signing the letters. That’s just the way it is for 
companies that invest in China—their CEOs are 






SECTION V – DISCUSSION 
 
Implications for FARA 
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 This study levels another blow against the lobbying 
transparency framework by demonstrating the inadequacy of 
the FARA reports. As this work has shown, data mined from 
FARA disclosures can quite effectively complement other 
methods of research in elucidating Chinese lobbying 
practices and deriving spending trends of Chinese foreign 
agents, but as a stand-alone system, the foreign lobbyist 
registration statute fails in multiple respects. Additionally, as 
evidenced by the LDA disclosures and scholarly research, 
FARA misses an entire universe of corporate lobbying that is 
conducted on China’s behalf—a universe that often spends 
more than the very small universe that FARA documents. 
Corporate lobbying by proxy is clearly the method that 
dominates the Washington lobbying landscape, as 
corporations have often shelled out millions of dollars a year 
to lobby for China in order to endear themselves to Chinese 
representatives. And while the thought of corporations 
lobbying on behalf of their own economic interests is neither 
new nor novel, the phenomenon of quintessentially U.S. 
multinational companies working with a foreign government 
to subvert the economic interests of the United States 
absolutely is. 
As China transforms into the world’s next 
superpower, it appears that U.S. corporations may chase it 
with profligate sycophancy. Either compelled by profit 
margins, or by an altruistic sense of cosmopolitanism, it 
seems that the great torrents of U.S. ingenuity will come to 
disentangle their interests from that of the United States. 
Therefore, in order for the United States to create a bulwark 
against a manifesting Fifth Column, it should revise FARA 
in a way that forces these corporate proxies to disclose their 
communications with the Chinese government. The efficacy 
of this change is somewhat dubious, but as Chinese interests 
have already demonstrated, the notion of public stigma might 
be enough to forestall the growing ties between a rising 
China and U.S. multinational corporations. This is unless 
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what appears to be a mounting corporate rejection of China’s 
goals—as evidenced by Caterpillar’s lobbying efforts—
begins to take sway. It is possible that, during the 1980s and 
1990s, U.S. companies viewed China as the new business 
frontier where the next trillion dollars would be made. 
However, through its abusive business practices that 
castigate U.S. companies, China has demonstrated little to no 
regard for the health of U.S. corporations. Therefore, it 
seems likely that a backlash, orchestrated by Congress and 
backed by U.S. corporations, might come to bring China’s 
lobbying by proxy efforts within Washington to light and 
keep them at bay. 
 
Plausibility of Lobbying by Proxy 
 
 The results of this study paint a partial picture of how 
China’s lobbying by proxy occurs. The findings seem to 
suggest that there is often some form of communication that 
goes on between Chinese officials and leaders of U.S. 
corporations. Even the aforementioned C.I.A. disclosure on 
Chinese espionage reported that “…the Chinese Government 
continues to seek influence in Congress through various 
means…including engaging U.S. business interests to weigh 
in on issues of mutual concern.”81 Interviewees 1 and 3 
corroborated this finding. 
Yet as Interviewee 3 demonstrates, this 
understanding between China and the U.S. multinational 
corporations is a very implicit one. Moreover, the underlying 
factor of this phenomenon of lobbying by proxy is the fact 
that U.S. companies fear Chinese economic 
excommunication. Interviewee 3 explained that the U.S. 
Trade Department has been looking for instances in which 
China violated international trade laws in the hope of taking 
them to a WTO court, but corporations—against their own 
interest—refuse to comply for fear of retaliation by the 
Chinese government. “If they go along with the case, China’s 
going to figure out who’s going up against them, and they’re 
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bound to retaliate,” says Interviewee 3.82 Ultimately, it 
appears that China is implicitly pressuring corporations into 
lobbying on its behalf through fear of sanctions, not mutual 
advancement of policy goals. 
 
The Future of Chinese Lobbying Efforts 
 
 Based on the accounts of all three of the 
interviewees, it appears that China quite recently has altered 
the ways in which it goes about lobbying the United States 
Congress. As the three explain, China has set up its own 
mini-lobbying firm within the Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China, contracting firms such as Patton Boggs to 
meet with members of Congress on its behalf. As China 
expert John Pomfret says in an article in the Washington 
Post, “For years, as China steadily rose to global economic 
and political heights, it all but ignored the U.S. Congress, 
with outreach to American lawmakers left to friends in the 
business community. But now China has launched a 
multimillion-dollar lobbying effort so effective that it is 
challenging the heralded efforts of nemesis Taiwan.”83 The 
journalist goes on to quote Representative J. Randy Forbes 
(R–VA), the head of the Congressional China Caucus, who 
explains: “The Chinese have for years been wielding a lot of 
influence. They’ve liked to do it under the radar. But as 
there’s been more light shed on it, they’ve had to change 
their ways.”84 
This beckons the question: have research methods 
from this report managed to capture what this change of 
ways has entailed, or has it stayed completely out of the 
reach of data collection techniques of this thesis? Can this 
new form of Chinese advocacy explain why Embassy and 
SOE spending drop off so drastically after 2008? Findings 
seem to indicate that 2009-2010 marked the beginning of a 
new era of Chinese lobbying efforts, an era that future 
research will hopefully seek to elucidate. 
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SECTION VI – CONCLUSION 
 
 This study is the first of its kind to grant a glimpse 
into the backdoor dealings of Chinese lobbying efforts. It is 
the first non-journalistic piece to describe the interconnected 
nature of lobbying efforts made by multinational 
corporations and the Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China. Furthermore, it applies the lobbying by proxy model 
to Chinese advocacy efforts, suggesting that Chinese official 
or other agents functioning on the government’s behalf 
actively or implicitly compel multinational corporations to 
lobby the United States Congress with the intention of 
delivering China’s own policy goals. It describes the 
capacities of the China Lobby of the twenty-first century and 
demonstrates another shortcoming of the FARA framework. 
 Furthermore, this research sets the stage for a 
comparison between Chinese lobbying tactics and those of 
other foreign sovereigns. Potentially interesting future 
research could be a comparison between China’s tactics and 
India’s. Is there a possibility that India, as a burgeoning 
superpower, is also practicing a similar lobbying by proxy 
method? Is it the case that U.S. multinational corporations 
are also lobbying on India’s behalf for fear of economic 
excommunication? Or is it possible that India’s more 
hospitable foreign investment policies make it an entirely 
different lobbying animal? Lastly, future research should 
make an effort to determine the fate of what appears to be a 
mounting corporate insurgency against China’s economic 
interest in the United States. Will U.S. corporations reject 
China’s implicit calls to lobby on its behalf, or will fear of 
economic sanctions intimidate U.S. multinationals into 
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Money Spent Timeframe Cited Legislation or Policy Issues 
 
1. Citigroup $60,000 2000 H.R. 4444  
2. American Apparel $360,000 2000 H.R. 4444  
3. Nestle $400,000 2000 H.R. 4444  
4. United Technologies $1.5 million 2000 H.R. 4444  
5. General Motors $2.22 million 2000 H.R. 4444  
6. Chrysler $3.67 million 2000 H.R. 4444  
7. Liberty Mutual $380,000 2007 
“matters relating to U.S.-China 
bilaterial [sic] trade 
negotiations” 
 
8. Caterpillar $13.73 million 2006-2011 S.14, S.295, S.337, S. 984, and H.R.2208 
 
9. U.S. Chamber of Commerce $62.35 million 2008 * 
 
10. Boeing $162 million 2006-2011 “US – China Relations” and “China Trade Issues” 
 
*H.R. 3273, U.S.-China Market Engagement and Export Promotion Act, Strategic Economic Dialogue with China, U.S.-China Joint 
Commission on Commerce and Trade, all trade discussions, H.R. 3273 - United States-China Market Engagement and Export Promotion Act, 
H.R. 3272, the “United States-China Diplomatic Expansion Act of 2007,” H.R. 3272, H.R. 3274, H.R. 3275 “US-China Competitiveness 
Agenda of 2007,” H.R. 3275 - the "US-China Language Engagement Act," H.R. 3274 - the "US-China Energy Cooperation Act 
 
                                                
1 “Querying the Lobbying Disclosure Act Database,” Ibid.  Disclosures made to the congressional clerk created by Lobbying 
Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), [2 U.S.C. § 1601] by Citigroup, American Apparel, Nestle, United Technologies, General 
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